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INTRODUCTION

A number of states, including West Virginia, still adhere wholly
or partially to a doctrine for deciding conflict of laws cases that is

* Part two of Professor McLaughlin's article will appear in Volume Ninety-Four, Issue One,
of the West Virginia Law Review.
** B.A. Ohio State University, 1962; J.D. Ohio State University, 1965; Assistant Professor,
West Virginia University, College of Law, 1968; Professor of Law, 1974 to present.
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rooted in nineteenth century legal conceptualism. This dated doctrine
is still clung to because of its apparent certainty. This apparent certainty is especially attractive in light of what Justice Richard Neely

of the West Virginia court calls the "fuzziness" of the modern alternatives.' Prompted by Justice Neely's comments, I am writing an
article to make clear (uncover, dig up?) the conceptual roots of what
is generally thought to be an outdated doctrine (lex loci); to demonstrate the death of those roots and to demonstrate that the certainty thought to be generated by this dead tree of a doctrine is
illusionary. In Part Two, I shall then attempt in a limited compass
to describe the modern approach in its various guises, underline its
common features and critique its principal weaknesses. I shall also
propose that the approach of Second Restatement of the Conflict

of Laws can be used to help solve choice of law problems if the
general aim of choice of law rules is kept in mind. The general aim
of choice of law is to apply the law that makes the most sense in
settling the legal dispute before the court.
The legal analysis attendant to choice of law decisions occasions
a contrast between the old and the new ways of thinking about law
that is nowhere else so vividly marked out. In judicial rhetoric,
scholarly treatments and judicial practice, the contrast is stark, but
often, strangely blurred. Indeed, although the old way of thinking
(hereafter lex locI)2 has no scholarly defenders and few judicial adherents, 3 one still often reads opinions in which the judge laments

1. Oakes v. Oxygen Therapy Services, 363 S.E.2d 130, 131 (W. Va. 1987); Paul v. Nat'l Life,
352 S.E.2d 550, 551, 553-56 (W. Va. 1986).
2. The phrase "lex loci" is often used and will be used here as shorthand for the whole
doctrine rooted in vested rights-territorialism that came to final form in the First Restatement, REsTATEmENT, CoNmrcT oF LAws (1934) [hereafter referred to as the First Restatement]. "Lex loci" is
also often used to denote any rule or interest that points to the law of the place where the cause of
action arose and is contrasted with lex fori, the law of the forum hearing the lawsuit.
3. Cataloguing the states that still adhere to lex loci in some form is problematic. Not only
might lex loci be adhered to in one area such as torts but not in another, such as contracts, (Compare
Paul v. National Life, 352 S.E.2d 550 (,V. Va. 1986) (torts-Iex loci) with Lee v. Saliga, 373 S.E.2d
345 (W. Va. 1988) (contracts - no lex loci)) but a state may not have faced the issue lately such
that it is hard to guess the states's current position. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Blakely, 152 Vt. 113, 564
A.2d, 590 (1989) where although the "federal courts have predicted that we will abandon lex foci in
favor of a more flexible approach" the court refused to endorse the prediction because such change
was unnecessary to the result. Id. at 115, 564 A.2d at 592.) Or it may have faced the issue and
waffled on it. Compare Paul v. National Life, 352 S.E.2d 550 (N. Va. 1986), with Oates v. Oxygen
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/8
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the loss of the certainty of the old system that would be entailed
in embracing the new approach. 4 Indeed, judges often seem unable
to escape the beguiling rhetoric of the old system, even while formulating "tests" under the new. 5 In an area of law where certainty
seems most important to arriving at a satisfying doctrine (i.e., one

that is intellectually comprehensible, coherent, and feels just), why
has all this lamenting about certainty not led to a rejection of the
new "fuzziness" for that old tried and true certainty? This little
essay is an effort to explain why. I will show (not at all an original
Therapy, 363 S.E.2d 130, (V. Va. 1987). With that caveat, then, here are some not very certain facts
about the current state of lex loci acceptance: Some fifteen states still adhere to lex loci in some
form. These states contain about 18% of the United States population. They are: Alabama (Powell
v. Sappington, 495 So. 2d 569 (Ala. 1986)); Delaware (Friday v. Smoot, 58 Del. 488, 211 A.2d 594
(1965)); Cooper v. Ross & Roberts Inc., 505 A.2d 1305 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986); Amoroso v. Joy Mfg.
Co., 531 A.2d 619, 621 (Del. Super. Ct. 1987); Georgia, (Yates v. Lowe, 179 Ga. App. 888, 348
S.E.2d 113 (1986)); Kansas, (Brown v. Kleen Kut Mfg. Co., 238 Kan. 642, 714 P.2d Kan. 942 (1986);
Kalamazoo Mfg. Co. v. Anderson, 712 F. Supp. 854, 858 (D. Kan. 1989)); Maryland (Bethlehem
Steel Corp. v. G. C. Zarnas & Co., 304 Md. 183, 498 A.2d 605 (1985) (contracts); Hauch v. Connor,
295 Md. 120, 453 A.2d 1207, (1983); Bishop v. Twiford, 317 Md. 170, 562 A.2d 1238 (1989); Kramer
v. Baly's Park Place Inc., 311 Md. 387, 535 A.2d 466 (1988)); Montana (Kemp v. Allstate Insurance
Co., 183 Mont. 526, 601 P.2d 20 (1979); Direct Mail Specialist, Inc. v. Brown, 673 F. Supp. 1540
(D. Mont. 1987)); Nevada (Poindexter v. United States, 752 F.2d 1317, 1319-20 (9th Cir. 1984); New
Mexico (Church v. Church, 96 N.M. 388, 630 P.2d 1243 (Ct. App. 1981)); North Carolina (Shaw
v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963); South Carolina (Algie v. Algie, 261 S.C. 103, 198
S.E.2d 529 (1973)); South Dakota (Schick v. Rodenburg, 397 N.W.2d 464 (S.D. 1986)); Tennessee
(See Bailey v. Chattem, Inc. 684 F.2d 386, 393 n.5 (6th Cir. 1982)); Vermont (Calhoun v. Blakely,
152 Vt. 113, 564 A.2d 590 (1989); Virginia (Frey v. Virginia, 231 Va. 370, 345 S.E.2d 267 (1986));
West Virginia (Paul v. National Life, 352 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1986). But see Oates v. Oxygen Therapy,
363 S.E.2d 130 (XV. Va. 1987) (both as to lex loci delicti)); Wyoming (V-1 Oil Co. v. Ranck, 767
P.2d 612 (Wyo. 1989)).
For a more comprehensive summary of prevailing conflict approaches state by state, see Smith,
Choice of Law in the United States, 38 HAST. L.J. 1041-1174 (1987). See also, Kozyris, Choice of
Law in the American Courts in 1987: An Overview, 36 AM. J. CorP. L. 547 (1988); Symeonides,
Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1988, 37 AM. J. Comp. L. 457 (1989); Kozyris & Symeonides,
Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1989: An Overview, 38 AM. J. CoMP. L. 601 (1990);
Kramer, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1990: Trends and Developments, 39 AM. J. ComP.
L. (1991).
4. Justice Richard Neeley stated in Paul v. National Life, 352 S.E.2d 550, 555 (W. Va. 1986):
"Lex loci delicti has long been the cornerstone of our conflict of laws doctrine. The consistency,
predictability and ease of application provided by the traditional doctrine are not to be discarded
lightly .... " See also Owen v. Owen, 444 N.W.2d 710 (S.D. 1989) (referring to "its built-in virtues
of certainty, simplicity and ease of application") id. at 711; McMillan v. McMillan, 219 Va. 1127,
253 S.E.2d 662 (1979) ("uniformity, predictability, and ease of application"). Id. at 1131, 253 S.E.2d
at 664.
5. See, e.g., Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 286 N.E.2d 454 (1972);
Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90, 480 N.E.2d 679, (1985)
(Jasen dissenting).
Disseminated
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undertaking) that the old certainty was built on the simplicity and
intuitive appeal of its basic concepts and the ease with which from
these basic concepts one could spin out a few simple rules which
supposedly solved all cases. However, the certainty supposed to attend the simplicity is an illusion bordering on delusion. Moreover,
this illusion of certainty was paid for at the price of results that
were simply arbitrary in terms of judicial policy, social policy, or
justice. 6 Finally, I will suggest that the new doctrine, for all its fuzziness of statement and multiplicity of forms, is more certain than
the old doctrine and far less arbitrary. The new choice of law approach creates no illusions about simple solutions to complex and
difficult problems. Lots of simple cases under the old rules become
hard cases under the new because they are in fact hard cases: cases
involving difficult choices. Only through painstaking analysis are the
choices fully revealed and is their resolution confidently undertaken.
The hard cases with their hard choices were always there, but their
difficulty was simply swept under the carpet of lex loci, a carpet
that, as will appear, was truly a magic carpet; it never touched any
ground but that of reified abstract legal concepts.
II.

THE ILLUSION OF CERTAINTY OF LEx

Loci DocTRNE

A.

Its Simple Concepts
The two simple concepts on which the lex loci gospel was built
are the exclusivity of territorial sovereignty and the vested transitory
6. This, of course, is the main charge leveled at lex loci over the years. For an often cited
and quite systematic demonstration of the arbitrariness of lex loci contractus (law of the place of

making) see Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. CHI.
L. REv. 227 (1958) reprintedin Currie, SELEcmn EssAYS ON CONFLCT OF LAws (1963). Walter Wheeler
Cook (1873-1943) in TH LOGIcAL AND LEcA, BASES OF Tn CONFLICT oF LAws (1942) an anthology
of articles written between 1919 and 1942 attacks the lex loci system root and branch: "root," the
logic of lex loci territorialism and vested rights makes no sense and "branch," courts do not really
"do" lex loci anyway, they may "talk" it but they do not do it. The late Professor Albert A.

Ehrensweig, made it his life's work to show that lex loci was not in fact "done" by courts. A.
EannNSWEo, CoNFLIcT OF LAws (1962); A. EmiENSWEIZ, CONFLICTS IN A NuT'smaa (3d ed. 1974).
Indeed, most commentators in the heyday of the FInT REsTATEmENT, CONFLICT oF LAWS (1934 to

1963) assumed lex loci was mostly "talk" and not the "real" basis for decision. See E. LORENZEN,
SmcETD ARTICLES ON TH CONFLICT OF LAWS (1947) and D. CAVERS, A CRITIQUE OF ThE CHOICE
OF LAw PROBLEM, 47 HARv. L. REv. 173 (1933).
Thus, the critique of fex loci doctrine went from it cannot be done because it makes no logical
sense, to it has not been done as revealed by what courts have in fact decided and that it ought not
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/8
be done because it reaches results that make no sense. My emphasis in this article is that, in addition 4
to the above critique, it ought not be done because it also lacks predictability, its vaunted attribute.
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cause of action. Is it not obvious that a sovereign has exclusive
jurisdiction to create rights, duties, and all legal relationships within
its physical boundaries and no power whatsoever outside its boundaries? 7 And is it not obvious that a lawsuit must be predicated on

a good cause of action; one which had a life prior to filing as a
chose-in-action which "chose" came into existence at the time and

place of the last event necessary to its existence? And is it not clear
that at that place and moment this right to sue "vested" in the
owner (i.e., became a vested right of the owner)?8 Finally, a third

concept plays a role, the concept of a lawsuit as debt collection.
After all, a lawsuit is, according to no less a light than Benjamin

7. See, J. STORY, Co
NARIES ON THE CoNFuCT OF LAWS §§ 18, 20 (2d ed. 1841). (In 1924
Professor Ernest G. Lorenzen of Yale Law School, wrote a withering critique of Story's territorial
premise, then citing the 8th Edition of 1883 of his commentaries, which publication record itself shows
the influence of Story's ideas.) Lorenzen stated, "The only conclusion that can be reached from the
foregoing discussion is that the rules of the Conflict of Laws are not based upon, nor are they derivable
from, any uniform theory of territoriality." E. LoEENzEN, SELECTED ARCLES ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 9 (1947) (reprinting the 1924 article, Territoriality,Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33
YALE L.J. 736). "In view of the foregoing it is a little surprising to find among the American courts
and writers of today a tendency to accept the doctrine of territoriality of law as the major premise
for the solution of the problems of the Conflict of Laws." Id. Lorenzen then adds proof of his
"major premise" thesis by quoting Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23 HARv.
L. REv. 79 (1909): "If the law of the place where the parties act refuses legal validity to their acts,
it is impossible to see on what principle some other law may nevertheless give their acts validity...
Any attempt to make the law of the place of performance govern the act of contracting is an attempt
to give to that law extraterritorial effect." Id. at 267.
8.
Hence it is that a vested right of action is property in the same sense in which tangible
things are property, and is equally protected against arbitrary interference. Whether it springs
from contract or from the principles of the common law, it is not competent for the legislature to take it away.
Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 132 (1882). In Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120
(1903), Justice O.W. Holmes, gave the oft cited (and criticized) obligation explanation:
But when such a liability is enforced in a jurisdiction foreign to the place of the wrongful
act, obviously that does not mean that the act in any degree is subject to the lexfori, with
regard to either its quality or its consequences. On the other hand, it equally little means
that the law of the place of the act is operative outside its own territory. The theory of
the foreign suit is that although the act complained of was subject to no law having force
in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio, which, like other obligations, follows
the person, and may be enforced wherever the person may be found. Stout v. Wood, I
Blackf. 71; Dennick v. Central R.R. Co., 103 U.S. 11, 18, 26 L. Ed. 439, 442. But as the
only source of this obligation is the law of the place of the act, it follows that law determines
not merely the existence of the obligation (Smith v. Condry, I How. 28, 11 L. 3d 35), but
equally determines its extent. It seems to us unjust to allow a plaintiff to come here absolutely depending on the foreign law for the foundation of his case, and yet to deny the
defendant the benefit of whatever limitations on his liability that law would impose.
Disseminated
by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991
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Cardozo, the enlistment of the coercive power of the state to help
the plaintiff get what he "owns" from the defendant who is wrongfully withholding it. 9 The Cardozoian concept of a lawsuit as debt
collection is central to the old dogma, but is perhaps best seen as
a natural by-product of conceiving of a "cause of action" as a
"vested right." All lawsuits then are simply the conversion of a
cause of action, a species of property, into a judgment so that the
defendant, now a judgment debtor, can be strong-armed into paying
(i.e., turning the plaintiff's property over to him).
B.

Its Simple Rules
These simple concepts led to simple rules, rules that had an inevitability about them that gave them an aura of revealed truth.
These rules needed to serve no social or political purpose because
they were simply the true rules, the ineluctable outgrowth of true
concepts. And there were only a few of these rules, at least so it
seemed (or seems) at a quick glance and with such rules that was
all the glance one needed (or needs).
For all torts there is a rule, summarized by the phrase lex loci
delictus (in latin, no less, to certify its "true-ruleness") which states
that wherever the last event occurs that creates a cause of action
for a civil wrong or "tort," that place, that sovereignty, creates that
right in all its legal dimensions. 10 Thus, if a car is negligently repaired
9.
A foreign statute is not law in this state, but it gives rise to an obligation, which, if transitory, 'follows the person and may be enforced wherever the person may be found' Cuba
R.R. Co. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 478 .... No law can exist as such except the law of
the land; but ... it is a principle of every civilized law that vested rights shall be protected.
Beale [Conflict of Laws], § 51. The plaintiff owns something, AND WE HELP EM TO OET
IT.

If a foreign statute gives the right, the mere fact that we do not give a like right is no
reason for refusing to help the plaintiff in getting what belongs to him.
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 110, 120 N.E. 198, 201 (1918) (emphasis
added).
10. See Paul v. National Life, 352 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1986). In Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Brown, 234 U.S. 542, (1914) Justice Holmes stated:
Whatever variations of opinion and practice there may have been, it is established as the
law of this court that when a person recovers in one jurisdiction for a tort committed in
another, he does so on the ground of an obligation incurred at the place of the tort that
accompanies the person of the defendant elsewhere, and that is not only the ground but
the measure of the maximum recovery.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/8
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in state A, but falls apart in state B injuring the driver, the liability
of the negligent repairer will be determined by the law of state B
because that is where the cause of action came into being and
"vested" in the driver.
For all contracts there is a rule summarized by the phrase lex
loci contractus which states that wherever the final act occurs that
makes a promise binding it is that place whose law in all its fullness
and nuance creates the binding obligations called contract duties and
the correlative contract rights. As we shall shortly see, there are
alternative contract formulations which as easily flow from our basic
jural concepts, but the above formulation is the most appealing."
For all property in immovable things, a fixed star, lex rei sitae,
controls. This rule states that the law of the place where the immovable estate is creates and controls all property rights in that
estate. For all property in movable things, lex rei sitae also controls
for most property right formation. That rule mandates that the law
of the place where the movable object of property is at the time
the property interest comes into existence determines the existence
and contours of the right.
For decedent's estates and family law, follow the lex loci domicilii. For decedent's estates, the rule is that the law of the state in
which the decedent had his domicile at the time of his death will
control the succession and distribution of his personal estate. In
family law, aside from the validity of the marriage contract (lex loci
contractus), most issues of choice of law are determined by the domicile of the marriage which now is the domicile of each of the parties.
There, in four simple latin phrases all choice of law problems
are solved. True rules in ancient but timeless rhetoric. Why give that

11. Most "appealing" at least to Professor Beale, the grand articulator of lex loci doctrine.
The question whether a contract is valid ... can on general principles be determined by
no other law than that ... of the place of contracting. If the law at that place annexes
an obligation to the acts of the parties, the promisee has a legal right which no other law
has power to take away. . .. If on the other hand the law of the place where the agreement
is made annexes no legal obligation to it, there is no other law which has power to do so.
Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23 HARv. L. REv. 260, 270-71 (1910).
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up? Indeed, how can one (a polity?) give up the truth. We might
just as soon give up the notion that water has two hydrogen and
one oxygen atoms. In fact, it is more analogous to giving up the
"truth" that the four elements are fire, earth, air, and water. Time
has passed them by. The underlying concepts no longer have a ring
bf either importance or truth about them. The simple rules then
have lost their conceptual and only predication. Rationalizing the
retention of the lex loci rules on grounds of clarity, certainty and
economy are just that, rationalization. They are merely simple to
state. They do not bring clarity, certainty, or economy to the choice
of law process. But more on that anon.
C. The Hollowness of the Basic Concepts
None of the three predicate concepts (territoriality, vested rights
and lawsuit as debt collection) will stand modern scrutiny. The notion of exclusive territorial sovereignty is true, but trivial. In the
complex events that give rise to most legal disputes, a single territorial locus is impossible to find. The seemingly single and simple
event of (say) X driver of Y car on D day at H hour may seem to
have a simple locus, but the car itself was made elsewhere (its component parts made many elsewheres) its fuel made elsewhere, sold
still elsewhere; its exhaust and its sound will go elsewhere; the driver
has been elsewhere and formed relationships in several "elsewheres"
that shape his driving, his know-how, his purpose, and his right to
drive. Many of these "elsewheres," these different places that shape
and compose the events of life and, more pertinently, the events of
disputation, are in different sovereignties than the seeming locus of
the simple event. The single locus of any event is an abstraction
from the totality of the event; in the vernacular, it's a simplification
of a complex fact; events have spacial and temporal depth, and in
events that are the subject of disputation, the whole event in all its
depth (actually depth of events is infinite so, more accurately, it is
"the deeper event in its manageable depth") becomes relevant. Thus,
the many layers of events makes trivial for choice of law purposes
the notion of exclusivity of territorial sovereignty. Territoriality is
of course true and relevant to the decisional process, but it has no
talismanic significance. Where many territorial sovereigns are8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/8
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touched, the territorial concept helps little in choosing among them. 12
The concept of a "cause of action" as a "vested right" (with
a correlative vested duty) is simply a way of talking about a law
suit. Indeed, the idea of a cause of action comes from the need to
remove obviously unmeritorious claims (i.e., obviously one-sided
disputes) from the judicial arena in summary fashion. 13 The general
demurrer was the procedural vehicle for summary disposition, and
whether one had in one's complaint stated enough that if true en14
titled one to judicial aid was a technique of summary decision.
This looking to the tale told by the plaintiff in his initiating pleading
to determine whether a cognizable legal dispute existed came to be
talked about in terms of whether or not the plaintiff had stated a
good cause for judicial action, quickly truncated to whether plaintiff
had a cause of action. 15 The verb "to have" (unlike "to state")
suggests a physical type of possession and, voila, "a cause of action"
is like a physical thing that attaches to oneself. It needs a name
before it is sued on so the French word for thing, "chose," stands
in (from Law French) for the subject of property rights; thus is
born the chose-in-action (contrast with both the chose-in-possession
and the cause of action). Thus, when the last event necessary to a
good cause of action (one that will survive demurrer) happens, it
springs into being as a chose-in-action and vests (think of velcro)
in the future plaintiff. Moreover, everywhere this would-be plaintiff
goes, his vested right to sue follows. And, more importantly, eve16
rywhere the would-be defendant goes, the right to be sued follows.
However, a law suit is now viewed more realistically as the settlement of a dispute by law. The dispute involves past, present, and
usually future events. The pleadings are now used to give notice of
the dispute to the other disputant. They are no longer a ritualized

12. For an early attack on territoriality as the basis for choice of law rules, see E. LORENZEN,
supra note 7.
13. The slide from "vested right" to "vested cause of action" depends on right and cause of
action being synonymous or nearly so.
14. The old writ system of pleading out of which grew the idea of a cause of action had its

origins in ancient English practice.
15. See, KOFMR & REPPY, HANDBOOK ON CommosN LAw PLEADING (1969) for old ritual of
form of action, cause of action demurrer, and its history.
16. See Slater v. Mexico Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1903).
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way of asserting a pre-existing claim and demanding, in ritualized
form, its satisfaction. The facts and the law may entitle plaintiff to
win a judgment, but the exact nature of the facts and the law can
only be determined after the adversarial process has allowed each
side to participate in their development. The law of each case is
known only after trial. This is true, even where the dispute settling
law is statutory. This difference in perspective as to what a lawsuit
is and as to what legal rights are underlies the clash between the
old and the new approaches to choice of law.
Recently Professor Perry Dane of Yale claimed that the notion
of "vestedness" is essential to the rule of law. 7 "Vested rights" of
the Bealian variety (i.e. the kind Professor Joseph H. Beale the
grand guru of lex loci described) are not at all the same as "vestedness" (i.e., Dane's vestedness can be achieved far short of Bealian
vested rights). 8 My attack on "vested rights" and that part of
"modern" doctrine which I defend are perfectly consistent with vestedness as defined by Dane. However, I disagree with his claim that
vestedness is essential to the rule of law, and I disagree with the
vision of a lawsuit that "vestedness" implies. Moreover, I don't
believe that "vestedness" as a word or concept is particularly useful
in developing a satisfying choice of law approach. 9 But more on
that anon. First, let's look at the supposed certainty of the ancien
regime.
D.

The Uncertainty of the Simple Rules
1.

Their Inherent Indeterminacy

a. The Tort Rule (Lex Loci Delicti)
The paradigm case is Alabama Great Southern R.R. Co. v. Carroll.20 Most of the relevant events of the case (the employment con-

17. Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness, " and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191 (1987).
18. Id. at 1260-65.
19. Vestness ends up making lawsuits too backward-looking; the common law, a sort of positive
law; and introduces a conceptualism that interferes with the kind of analysis that leads to sensible
results.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/8
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tract, domicile of both parties and the negligent conduct) took place
in Alabama. Alabama had recently enacted a new labor law repealing the infamous triad of defenses against employee injury cases. 21
Mississippi had no such "modern" labor law. The plaintiff was
injured just inside the Mississippi border where the negligently maintained coupling broke. Simple case: Lex loci said Mississippi is where
the cause of action, if any, came into being. Mississippi law applies
in determining what the nature of the cause of action is and what
defenses there may be thereto. As we shall see in the next section,
that is a consummation many would wish to escape. 22 But for now,
this case is an example of the simplicity and certainty of the rule.
"Where did you get hurt?" "Mississippi." "Mississippi law controls
your suit then wherever you bring it." No problem.
But wait. What if "getting hurt" is further analyzed and proves
not so simple or "monolocal." Clearly some "hurts" will be hard
to localize. For example, where is the hurt to one's reputation located? To one's privacy? To one's expectations because of fraud?
To one's emotional well-being? To one's employment? To one's
consortium? Courts sometimes say the domicile of the victim. 23
Equally logically they also say every place a defamation has been
published or where the victim was when she first learned of the
defamation. 24
Moreover, even physical injury can be a problem if the injurious
source is internal, such as poison, or takes a long time to take effect.
It once was said that the cause of action for being poisoned (for
instance by tainted meat) vests where the poison "takes effect" 25
meaning, I presume, when it becomes symptomatic. But, of course,
it starts to take effect immediately. So one poisoned by bad fish on
the train in Maine may not feel queasy until New Hampshire, nauseous until Massachusetts, sweaty and vomiting until Connecticut
21. Contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and, the real suit killer, the fellow servant
rule.
22. See infra, note 86 and accompanying text.
/ 23. Dale System, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 527 (D. Conn. 1953); Palmisano v. News
Syndicate Co., 130 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
24. Palmisano, 130 F. Supp. at 19 n.2, lists nine solutions to this problem. See Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MicH. L. Ray. 959 (1953).
25. FmsT
RESTATEMENT, § 377, Rule 2 and Illustration 2.
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and suffer death until New York. The poison started to take effect
sans symptoms in Maine and continued to take more and more effect
in each state until it had its ultimate effect in New York.
Wrongful death actions in general were a problem for lex loci
delicti. Technically, the cause of action did not arise until death,
but the death often comes a long way from where the mortal blow
was struck. Which place was it to be? The First Restatement picked
the place the blow was struck. 26 Why? Supposedly the action arose
there in some inchoate fashion. In reality, it just made more sense
regardless of the conceptualization.
In this field of civil wrongs, lex loci delicti had much built in
uncertainty. But torts was the area of greatest certainty. In other
areas, actual certainty of result was never an honest claim for lex
loci doctrine as we shall now see with contracts.
b. The Contract Rule
It is here, rather than with torts, that lex loci is clearly neither
simple nor certain. 27 A cause of action for breach of contract can
be located in all faith to the vested rights/territorial concept in either
of two places. That is because there are two ways of conceptualizing
a cause of action for breach of contract. First is the idea that any
contract law suit is based on the contract. Of course, it's based on
the contract, you rejoin. Yes, but it's also quite plausibly based on
the breach of the contract. If on the contract, then the law creating
and controlling the cause of action based thereon is the law of the
place the promise became a contract. Of course, that may itself not
be so easy to find where offer and acceptance is interstate. But it
makes sense, conceptually, to find that place. Thus, the law of the
place of making is born. It sometimes had a special latin name, lex
28
loci celebrationis.
26. FWsT RSTATEUM, § 391.
27. In 1920 Professor Ernest G. Lorenzen began his article Validity and Effect of Contracts
in the Conflict of Laws, 30 YALE L.J. 565: "There is no topic in the conflict of laws in regard to
which there is greater uncertainty than that of contracts. In this country there is no agreement even
regarding the fundamental principles that should govern."
28. Lex loci contractusis the usual name for the place of making but lex loci contractus could

also be used for the place of performance rule. Lex loci celebrationiswas sometimes used. It meant

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/8
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However, if the cause of action in contract is actually based on
the breach of the contract, and not merely the contract after all
until the contract is breached, one has no cause of action, and the
mere recital of a valid contract in a complaint will make it subject
to demurrer (or as we now say dismissal for failure to state a claim
for relief), then the place the promise is broken ought to control
and the law of that place will determine whether a cause of action
has vested in the promisee. And for this also there was sometimes
a special latin name, lex loci solutionis.29
The pull of contradictory formulations of lex loci contractus is
seen in the oft-cited case of Poole v. Perkins3 where the "familiar
and well-settled" "general rule" is quoted:
It is the general rule that every contract is as to its validity, nature, interpretation
and effect, or, as they may be called, the right, in contradistinction to the remedy,
is governed by the law of the place where it is made, unless it is to be performed
in another place, and then it is governed by the law of the place where it is to
31
be performed.

Although the quoted rule purports to state a place of making
rule, it in fact states a place of performance rule. Since one only
follows the law of the place of making when it is also the place of
performance, it is obvious that one always follows the place of performance. Why is the rule stated in this elongated and unnecessarily
bifurcated way? Most likely it is the power of the concept of contract
"vestedness." The rights and duties created by contract vest as of
the time of the last act necessary to create the contract (and, of
course, somehow, the place); a moment located in space/time; the
vesting moment. Thus, the court repeated in rule form that idea
29. Lex loci solutionis was used originally for situations where the performance was a mere
payment for another's performance, i.e., the law of the place of payment of a note etc. It was used
occasionally to distinguish between a place of making and place of performance rule. Usually, however,
lex loci contractuswas used to mean either place of making or place of performance as the two rules
were often conflated into one illogical rule. See infra, note 30 and accompanying text.
30. 126 Va. 33, 101 S.E. 240 (1919).
31. Section 311, The First Restatement, states how the "place of contracting" determination
is to be made (by the law of the forum using "the general law of contracts." Comment d.) and then
gives a set of rules about finding that place. Sections 312, 314, 315, 316, 323 (Informal Unilateral
Contract), 325 (Informal Bilateral Contract), and 326. Then, in other places, the issues controlled by
the place of contracting are identified. E.g., §§ 332 (validity), 334 (formalities).
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and then perhaps unwittingly overrules it by saying unless the contract is to be performed elsewhere, then it's that "elsewhere" law

that controls. Perhaps it is a way to resolve the cognitive dissonance
created by the competing contract-vesting concepts. The court first
wants both making and performance in the same place. The case
with no dissonance. Then, as if an afterthought, if they do differ,
go with performance.

The First Restatement combined the two ideas, making and performance, in a way that was more than mere rhetoric. For some
purposes the place of making determined the rights of litigants (validity of contract), and for other purposes it was the place of performance (performance issues). 32 A nice, neat dichotomy except when
applied it is difficult to distinguish between "the nature and extent
34
of the duty [to perform] "3 and "the sufficiency of performance."
In other words, is a question about sufficiency of performance one
about what exactly was required under the contract (a question of

32. Section 355 defines place of performance as simply the state where "the promise is to be
performed." Section 358 then identifies five issues to be controlled by the place of performance
including manner, time and locality, sufficiency and excuse.
33. Section 332 [the place of contracting controls] (f): "except as stated in § 358, the nature
and extent of the duty for the performance of which a party becomes bound."
34. Section 358 [place of performance controls] (d) "the sufficiency of performance" and (e)
"excuse for non-performance." The comment b to § 358 tries to draw a "practical line separating
question of obligation from question of performances" as follows:
As stated in § 332, Comment c, there is no logical line which separates questions of the
obligation of the contract, which is determined by the law of the place of contracting, from
questions of performance, determined by the law of the place of performance. There is,
however, a practical line which is drawn in every case by the particular circumstances thereof.
When the application of law of the place of contracting would extend to the determination
of the minute details of the manner, method, time and sufficiency of performance so that
it would be an unreasonable regulation of acts in the place of performance, the law of the
place of contracting will cease to control and the law of the place of performance will be
applied. On the other hand, when the application of the law of the place of performance
would extend to a regulation of the substance of the obligation to which the parties purported to bind themselves so that it would unreasonably determine the effect of an agreement
made in the place of contracting, the law of the place of performance will give way to the
law of the place of contracting.
Section 358, comment b.
Well that surely clears things up! Beale, the reporter for the F=sT RE TATEMENT, CONFiCT OF
LAws did not much believe in the place of performance rule, although it has ancient roots, see, J.
SroRPY, CommlNTAhrss ON TH CoNFLcT OF LAws §§ 242, 280 (8th Ed. 1883), and must have only
begrudgingly made the concessions to the place of performance rule found in the First Restatement.
See Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23 HARv. L. Ray. 260, 270-72 (1910). 14
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/8
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contract interpretations like a question of law) or what was in fact
done by the promisor?
For example, A promises B to deliver ten tons of manure by
Saturday, May 20. In fact, A delivers ten tons of manure on Sunday
May 21. B refuses delivery saying manure meant cow manure and
this is horse manure and besides the manure is a day late. A says
manure is manure and besides B won't spread it until Monday anyhow so this is substantial performance. Now, is it a question of
what A was obligated to do under the contract or is it a question
of whether what A did do satisfied what he was obligated to do?
That is, was A's delivery of some kind of manure on the right
weekend a satisfaction of the promise to "deliver manure on Saturday?" It's obviously both a question of giving more precise meaning to the words of the promise and of characterizing in words what
happened. All applications of rules are like this. At the precise moment of application, a rule (including a contract obligation) "says"
the same words as the facts "say." The rule "says" "manure on
the weekend," the facts "say" "manure on the weekend." Voila,
contract obligation met, no cause of action. Or the rule "says" "cow
manure on Saturday" and the facts "say" "manure on the
weekend." Alas, the two differ, a breach occurs, and a cause of
action results. Or the rule "says" "manure on the weekend" and
the facts says "horse manure on the weekend." Again no match,
etc. Always it's a question of interpretation and characterizing the
facts.
In any event, the Restatement compromise has not proved to be
a precise tool for drawing lines. Moreover, two other ideas further
roiled any claim to clarity: contractual choice of law and the law
of the place of validation. Given that the vested rights/territorial
concept leads to two different places with regard to contracts, why
not allow the parties to choose a "reasonable" place? In an 1882
case, Pritchardv. Norton,35 the United States Supreme Court quoted
former Chief Justice John Marshall's "principle of universal law"
that "a contract is governed by the law with a view to which it was

35. 106 U.S. 124 (1882).
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made." ' 36 Although the precise basis for the Court's holding in Pritchardis not entirely clear, 37 the case is often cited for the proposition
that the parties to a contract may make the choice of law. Thus,
quite consistent with the lex loci view, courts have allowed parties
to opt out of a rule imposed choice to a party chosen choice.3"
Moreover, Pritchardand other cases of that vintage have been said
39
to contain a rule of validation, lex validitatis.
In sum then, the vested right/territorial dogma as applied to
contracts yields three main rules and two supplemental rules.40 The
high inherent indeterminacy of lex loci contractus makes it a likely
first casualty to the "new thinking. ' 41 In West Virginia, for example, the Supreme Court of Appeals steadfastly maintains that it
is a lex loci delicti state, but has clearly abandoned lex loci contractus
in favor of the "most significant contacts" approach of the second
restatement. 42
c.

The Property Rules

Lex rei sitae43 appears to be a precise rule for the property area.
After all, one usually has property "in" some physical thing, and
physical things are located in some definite place. But, of course,
36. Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat., 1, 48 (1825) quoted in Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S.124,
136 (1882).
37. The language and holding of the case supports any of three rules: the rule of party choice,
the rule of validation (sometimes called lex validitis), and rule of the place of performance.
38. An excellent discussion of the "law of the parties' intention" is contained in Siegelman v.
Cunard White Star Lines, Inc., 221 F.2d 189 (2nd Cir. 1955) (John Marshall Harlan (with Clark
concurring) and Jerome Frank dissenting).
39. A. EHRENzwEio, CONUCTS IN A NtrrsuhE § 52. 54-59 (3rd ed. 1974) cited in CRAMPTON,
ENTs-QUEMoNs, 4th Ed. (1987) at 162-163. The
Cuam, AND KAy, CoNFucT oF LAws, CAsEs-Co
rule of validation states that if there is a conflict between the laws of the place of making and the
place of performance then the law of the place that validates the contract terms at issue applies.
40. In brief, main rules: law of place of making (lex celebrationis), law of place of performance
(lex solutionis), law of placing making/performance (FmsT R=sTAmMNT); supplemental rules: law of
the parties choice (party autonomy), law of place validation (lex validitatis). The main rules each
purport to be the whole of lex contractus and the supplemental rules each add to lex contractus.
41. See VON MEHREN AND TRAUTMA, THE LAW OF MULT1STATE PROBLEMS, CASEs AND MATER AS ON CONFucT oF LAWS (1965) at 187.
42. Lee v. Saliga, supra note 3.
43. Sometimes written lex loci rei sitae and sometimes merely lex sitae. It means literally law of the place of the thing's location.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/8
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people do have property in "things" with no definite, physical location such as savings accounts and corporations and, more importantly, the property is actually "in" some person in just as
important a way as it is "in" some "thing." Thus, lex domicilii is
a natural rival to lex rei sitae in the property area, and, indeed,
domicile of the owner makes as much sense in terms of vested rights/
territoriality as does site of the thing owned.
Nonetheless, for most of the property area, lex rei sitae prevailed.
The reasons appear to be that some things, at least, are more fixed
than the people with the property rights and that "property" is, in
the vernacular, more strongly associated with the "things" in which
persons have property than with those persons. Thus, we use the
word property to mean both the bundle of interests in a "thing"
and the "thing" itself. But, to the average person, the word "property" means the thing owned as in "my property," "she owns much
property," "the property was in Ohio." As to the greater fixity of
things over persons, the traditional view divided choice-of-law-property cases along "fixity" lines; instead of real and personal property,
there were "movables" and "immovables." 44 And the more fixed
of these, the "immovables," gave rise to a stronger and much more
persistent lex rei sitae rule. 45 Some conflicts texts call it "the land
taboo" so firmly entrenched and powerful is it. 46 But even this clear

44. The correspondence is not one for one, but is nearly so. Leasehold interests in real property
are personalty but immovables. But for the most part real property interests are immovables, and
personal property interests are movables.
45.
The law governing rights of property in chattels has been expressed for centuries by the
maxim mobilia personam sequuntur, according to which movable property is deemed to
follow the person of the owner and governed by the law of his domicile. In modem times
personal property is frequently located permanently in a state other than that of the domicile
of the owner and for that reason the claims of the law of the situs have asserted themselves
more and more. By the beginning of the century it was held that the rights of third parties
in chattels should be determined on the basis of their actual situs at the time of the transaction. Today it is felt that property rights in chattels should be controlled by the law of
the situs even between the parties.
Lorenzen, Developments in the Conflict of Laws, 1902-42, 40 MICH. L. Rav. 781 (1942), reprinted
in LORENZEN, SMaXCTED ARTICIEs ON THE CONPUiCT OF LAWS 203, 217 (1947) .
46. CRAMPTON, CuRIE, AND KAY, CoNFLICTS OF LAws, CAsEs-Co
TrS-QUEsTIONs, 637-644

(4th Ed. 1987). Citing among other articles, Hancock: Equitable Conversion and the Land Taboo in
Conflict of Laws, 17 STAN. L. Rav. 1095 (1965). Its ancient lineage is attested to by Justice Story
in United States
v. Crosby,
11 Repository
U.S. (7 Cranch.)
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116 (1812): "The court entertains no doubt 17
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rule as to real estate has one wrinkle, the doctrine of renvoi, that
makes for some uncertainty that other lex loci rules do not share.
Renvoi will be discussed in a later section. Moreover, the problem
of characterization, which also will be discussed in the next section,
is especially troublesome with regard to "immovables." Finally, the
situs rule is so manifestly silly in some contexts, that judges will
stretch language and doctrine to avoid it.
But, lex rei sitae in the area of "movables" is a rule of great
inherent uncertainty. In the first place, there is the obvious fact that
"movables" are movable. The rule attempts to avoid this problem
by fixing the place the "tangible thing" is "at the time of the events
which create the interests. ' 48 But the litigated dispute will be about
those "events" which create the interests which probably will have
taken place over a sufficient period of time that the "movable" will
have moved, such as a gift sent through the mails, the sale of a
chattel (cars, mail order items, etc.) by mail or telephone or the
pledge of a valuable chattel for a loan. Each of these transfers can
obviously create problems of locating the chattel at "the moment
of transfer." When the moment of transfer occurred, if it occurred
at all, is likely part of the dispute.
Intangible "movables," such as stock, bonds, and bank accounts
create an even greater problem of location. The reason for this problem with intangible movables is that there is both a transfer title
document, which is tangible but is not "the" thing which is owned
but merely firm evidence of ownership, and there is the actual interest which is a kind of debt often owed by a corporation which
is a kind of person, an incorporeal or fictional person.4 9
.. that the title to land can be acquired and lost only in the manner prescribed by the law of the
place where such land is situate." Most cases books use In re Barrie's Fstate, 240 Iowa 431, 35
N.W.2d 658 (1949) to illustrate the stubborn persistence of lex rei situs as to land transfers in the
face of good sense.
47. See Clark v. Clark, 178 U.S.186 (1900). Here the Supreme Court reinstated lex rei sitae
over the heroic efforts of the lower courts to avoid it and do what made sense.
48. RESATEMIENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 211 (1934); see also §§ 255, 256, 257 and 258.

49. Even reifying a corporation into a kind of fictional person is thought to be a bad way of
thinking about legal statements about corporations, viz. "General Motors is liable to its customers
for faulty design of its cars," according to H.L.A. Hart, the English jurisprudent. See Hart, Definition
and Theory in Jurisprudence, (Inaugural Lecture at Oxford University, 1953), reprinted in CoHEN
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/8
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Moreover, there are many complex ways of holding property or
exercising property interests. The leading example is trusts where
even trying to locate the usually intangible object of the property
interest seems both futile and irrelevant, even to die-hard-vestedrights territorialists. For trusts, is the lex rei sitae the location of
the trustee, the active decision maker regarding the care and distribution of the entrusted property, or where the entrusted property
(usually intangible) is located, or where the trust instrument was
written or signed, or where the settlor lives or where the beneficiary
(cestui que trust) lives or is domiciled? Territoriality gives no clear
answer; "vested rights" points in several directions. Even the rule
itself, lex rei sitae, points several places.50
Finally, lex rei sitae loses out to lex domicilii where the property
holder's domicile becomes fixed by death (not so fixed, of course,
that substantial controversy can always be avoided as to where that
one fixed location might be).5 ' Switching rules gives rise to another
characterization decision; was a transfer inter vivos or testamentary?
If inter vivos, then lex rei sitae; but if testamentary, then lex domiciliij.2 But, more on "characterization" in the next section.

50. There is a much cited series of cases from New York involving the transfer of movable
property, inter vivos and testamentary, through the trust device: Hutchinson v. Ross, 262 N.Y. 381,
187 N.E. 65 (1933) (Quebec domiciliaries, New York trustee, marital settlement, inter vivos - Court
used place of property (title documents) to uphold trust in face of mobiliapersonam sequuntur and
marital domicile arguments); Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 275 N.Y. 95, 9 N.E.2d 792 (1937) (intent
of settlor followed); In re Bauer's Trust, 14 N.Y.2d 272, 251 N.Y.S.2d 23, 200 N.E.2d 207 (1964)
(New York settlor, New York trustees, power of appointment by will, settlor died domiciled in England, English will, no good under New York law, good under English law - rigidly followed situs
law - and defeated manifest intent and expectations of settlor, Fuld J. dissented); Wyatt v. Fulrath,
16 N.Y.2d 169, 264 N.Y.S.2d 233, 211 N.E.2d 637 (1965) (used situs rule to defeat strong policy of
marital domicile); In re estate of Crichton, 20 N.Y.2d 124, 281 N.Y.S.2d 811, 228 N.E.2d 799 (1967)
(rejected situs rule to apply marital domicile rule); Estate of Clark, 21 N.Y.2d 478, 288 N.Y.S.2d
993, 236 N.E.2d 152 (1968) (rejected situs and applied marital domicile rule - using interest analysis
to testamentary disposition); Estate of Renard, 56 N.Y.2d, 973, 453 N.Y.S.2d 625, 439 N.E.2d
341 (1982) (followed situs of property to defeat law of domicile in testamentary disposition).
51. Although the rule states that one always has one and only one domicile at any point in
time, two jurisdictions making the determination may each conclude that it is the one and only
domicile. See in re Dorrance'sEstate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 A. 303 (1932) (Pennsylvania says Pa. is the
one domicile); In re Dorrance'sEstate, 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 170 A. 6011 (1934) (New Jersey says N.J.,
etc.).
52. For example, compare Cutts v. Najdrowski, 123 N.J. Eq. 481, 198 A.885 (1938) with In
re Weinstein's Estate, 176 Misc. 592, 28 N.Y.S.2d 137 (Sup. Ct. 1941) and see supra, note 50.
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d. The Domicile Rule
Lex Domicilii figures in two areas of great concern in the practice
of law: descendant's estates and family law. In these areas, lex domiOiii seems a necessary legal concept. Both areas focus on an individual, or definite set of individuals, and seek to sort out a set
of future relations between that individual(s), her property, and other
people. At one time, a marriage itself (the res) was thought to have
a single domicile.53 The single domicile is a concept more perfectly
consonant with territoriality than the "modern" idea that a marriage
"res" is located where either party to it is domiciled.14 But finding
a simple separate marital domicile was difficult and required determining which party was at fault before jurisdiction of the divorce
court attached. This seemed a bit like putting the cart before the
horse.
Domicile itself is not a certain concept, although the rules about
finding it are easily stated.5 5 As a choice of law rule, it is mildly
predictable once it is determined that the domicile of someone is to
determine the applicable law. Except for divorce and descendent's
estate, however, domicile has not been an obvious basis for choice
of law under the lex loci regime. Domicile plays a more important
role under the modern regime which will be discussed in the next
section. Nonetheless, several additional points about domicile as a
determinate legal concept are appropriately mentioned at this point,
even though they are somewhat tangential to my main thesis that
the lex loci doctrine is not highly determinant.

53. Haddad v. Haddad, 201 U.S. 562 (1906).

54. Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
55. White v. Tennant, 31 W. Va. 790, 8 S.E. 596 (1888) is the case most often used as a
principal case in conflict of laws case books no doubt because of its unusual facts as to residency
and its wooden application of the rule. The rule is (more or less) "One's domicile is the place one
resides with the intent to make that place one's home for the time being and with no definite plans
to return to one's former home." It took thirty-three sections of the First Restatement to define
domicile. See RESATEmENT oF CoNFLcT op LAws, §§ 9-41 (1934). In White, residency was established

by moving furniture into a Pennsylvania house and going to the house, from West Virginia, for
several weeks, to feed the livestock. The present intent to live in Pennsylvania was clear. But death
in West Virginia, his lifelong domicile, intervened. Ruled sufficient residency in Pennsylvania, its law
as to descendant's estates applied in spite of descendent's lifelong association with Vest Virginia and
almost no association with Pennsylvania.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/8
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Domicile is a pervasive theme in public and private law. It is
relevant in many contexts that are only marginal to choice of law:
judicial jurisdiction, 56 voting rights, 57 college fees, 58 receipt of welfare
benefits, 59 and other governmental benefits6° and burdens. 61 One of
the major law school texts uses domicile as "the chosen point of
entry" to the entire field of Conflict of Laws. 62
Although used in many contexts, domicile once was a unitary
concept, its meaning the same no matter what its use. 63 Its meaning
now tends to vary with context. 4 Of course, the realists say its meaning always varied with context (and within context). 65 But then the
realists thought that the exact meaning of any concelt varied with
context. 66 Domicile acquired after the time period of the principal
facts of a legal dispute (i.e., after the cause of action has "vested")
gives pause. Traditional thinking had it that so-called "after ac-

56. A court's jurisdiction over the person of an individual can be predicated on either in-state
domicile (Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940)) or presence at the moment of service (Burnham
v. Superior Court of California, 110 S.Ct. 2105 (1990)); Carr v. Carr, 375 S.E.2d 190, 192 (W. Va.
1988)) or past contacts (International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)) and federal court
subject matter jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases is, of course, based on domicile.
57. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
58. Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978).
59. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 636 (1969).
60. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
61. Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982).
62. REESE, RosENBmno, HAY, CoNF cT oF LAWS, CAsES AND MATERLts, ch. 2 at 8-35 (9th
Ed. 1990).
63. RESATE ENT OF CONFuCT OF LAWS (1934).
64. See, generally, Reese, Does Domicile Bear a Single Meaning? 55 CoLuM. L. R-v.589 (1955).
But see, Toll v. Moreno, 884 Md. 425, 397 A.2d 1009 (1979) (which steadfastly adheres to the one
meaning dogma).
65. Professor Walter Wheeler Cook argued in 1925: "the exact point at which [a court] draws
the line is undoubtedly drawn with the concrete problem that they have before them in mind ...."
3 American Law Institute, Proceedings 227 (1927) quoted in CRAMPN, CuRm, KAY, CONFLICT OF
LAWS, CASEs-CommENTs-QuE
oNs at 45, (4th Ed. 1987). See also COOK, Tm LOOicAL "ND LEoAL
BASES OF Tim CONFLICT OF LAWS, 194-210 (1942).
66. By "realists" is meant a movement in American law that has been labeled American Legal
Realism which has been highly influential in legal academia from the 1920's until the present. Its
major tenets are that the law is judicial decisions, not rules laid down, and that judicial decisions
have been, and ought to be, guided, but not dictated by, past decisions with primary concern for
the distinctive facts of each case and for the social consequences of any decisions read as a rule to
guide future action. See Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism, 44 Hxv. L. Ray. 1222 (1931);
Golding. Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy in Twentieth Century America-Major Themes and
Developments, 36 J. LEai EDUC. 41 (1986).
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quired domicile" cuts no ice. 67 To the vested rights theorists, of
course, anything happening after the rights vest including a change
of domicile of one of the parties is simply irrelevant, period. 68 A

modem rights based theory of litigation 69 also views after-acquired
domicile as irrelevant to choice of law .70 Modern rights based theories view litigation as the resolution of a dispute about past events
and the liabilities created by those events, with liability being a direct
function of rights and duties that existed at the time of the events
according to some state's positive law. Such a theory is different
from "vested rights" theory because it does not dictate which state's
positive law it must accord with, while "vested rights" necessarily
says it is the law of the state where the last event necessary to create

the vested right (i.e., the cause of action) occurred. Justice Lewis
Powell summarized the rights-based position in his dissenting opinion in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague;71 "a postaccrual residence has
nothing to do with facts to which the forum state proposes to apply
its rule .... "72
On the other hand, Justice Brennan held for the Court in Allstate
that the "postoccurrence change of residence" was relevant to the

67. Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal.2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 730, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967) (Traynor J.,
a traditionalist at war with tradition, held that allowing after-acquired domicile to matter would
encourage forum shopping.).
68. See, e.g., Justice Brandeis's opinion in John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Yates,
299 U.S. 178, 182 (1936).
69. See, Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness," and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191 (1987).
70. Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 1287 (1989).
71. 449 U.S. 303 (1981).
72. The full paragraph reads:
This rule is sound. If a plaintiff could choose the substantive rules to be applied to an
action by moving to a hospitable forum, the invitation to forum shopping would be irresistible. Moreover, it would permit the defendant's reasonable expectations at the time
the cause of action accrues to be frustrated, because it would permit the choice-of-law
question to turn on a postaccrual circumstance. Finally, postaccrual residence has nothing
to do with facts to which the forum State proposes to apply its rule; it is unrelated to the
substantive legal issues presented by the litigation.
Id. at 337.
For those keeping score, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined in Powell's dissent
with Justice Stevens concurring in the above-quoted statement. Id. at 331.
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choice-of-law issue. 73 Other cases support the idea that after-acquired
domicile is relevant to choice of law. 74 Needless to say, allowing
after-acquired domicile to count implies something quite fundamental about the nature of a law suit. It says that a law suit is the
effort to resolve a present dispute about past, present and future
events.7 5 This implied assumption is so fundamental as never to be

mentioned by court or commentator. I will have more to say about
76
this in Part Two.
The domicile of corporations is also of continuing concern. The

simple question, "What is the domicile of a corporation?" leads to
such further questions as, "Should 'domicile' be used regarding cor-

porations or is some other concept more appropriate to locating a
corporation?" and "Should corporations have more than one domicile, or official location (as they can have more than one state
citizenship for diversity cases)? 77 The Restatement (Second) Conflict
of Laws § 11, comment 1, says, "[N]o useful purpose is served by
assigning a domicile to a corporation." Moreover, the traditional
doctrine of lex incorporationis7 8 assumed that the place of incorporation was how a corporation was legally located and domicile

73. Id. at 319. Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun concurred. Justice Stewart did not
participate. Score on relevance of "after acquired domicile" in Supreme Court: 4-4.
74. Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734, 237 N.E.2d 877, 882-83 (1968); Haines
v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 47 Wis. 2d 442, 450, 177 N.W.2d 328, 332 (1970). See Note, Post Transaction
or Occurrence Events in Conflict of Laws, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 843 (1969).
75. See supra notes 18 & 19 and accompanying text.
76. For a discussion of many hypothetical cases involving after acquired domicile and when it
should and should not count, see Hancock, The Effect in Choice of Law Cases of the Acquisition
of a New Domicile After the Commission of a Tort or the Making of a Contract, 2 HASTINGS INT'L
& CoMsP. L. REV. 215 (1979).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1988). A corporation is a citizen of the state of its incorporation and
of the state of its principal place of business which has generally been read to mean either where
most of its physical property and employees are located or, if no such state, where its "nerve center"
is located.
78. In Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 DuiKE L.J. 1, 15, the author states:
"An established rule of traditional Conflicts - developed by the courts in the absence of legislative
intervention - is that the internal corporate relationship is governed by the law of the state of
incorporation" (citing the FroST RE TATE ENT). He adds "A review of cases decided over the last
twenty-five years reveals that, despite the conflicts revolution, in all but a handful of these the law
of the state of incorporation was applied without discussion." Id. at 17-18. This is one traditional
area that does indeed have certainty and has remained relatively free from intrusion by modern
doctrine. But see Western Airlines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961).
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was simply not mentioned. Domicile is occasionally mentioned with
regard to corporations out of necessity because of statutory language 79
or out of habit.8 0
Domicile is, in important ways, a concept of both necessity and
habit. We do need to have a single, fixed location for persons for
some things, e.g., for "general jurisdiction" over persons,8' for voting, for many governmental burdens (licensing) and benefits. But
the domiciliary concept was not central to choice of law under the
lex loci regime and, where it was used, it was used seemingly out
of necessity. Under some of the modern regimes, especially interest
analysis & la Brainerd Currie8 2 and political rights analysis a la Lea
Brilmayer, 3 domicile of the parties is central to choice of law. Nonetheless, even those domicile-heavy-choice techniques do not require
the single domicile notion, i.e., in a close case nothing should turn
on where the single domicile lies. The fact that more than one state
has substantial connection with a party must be taken into account
in accessing each state's interests or any parties political rights. In
any event, the residential affiliations of the parties is of great concern in all modem approaches, but the old idea of a singular domicile is, for the most part, unnecessary, and searching for a single
home (where your heart is) will fade with time.84

79. See, e.g., Berger & Engel Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus, 172 Mass. 154, 51 N.E. 531 (1898)
(Holmes J.); Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co. 288 U.S, 476 (1933). RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 41 (1934).
80. See e.g., the contents headings to "Interpretive Notes and Decisions" of 28 U.S.C.S. §
1332 (1988) listing "3. Domicile of Corporations [28 USCS § 1332(c)]" at p. 23 & 280.
81. "General jurisdiction" is the jurisdiction a court has over a person when it will try any
claim against her within the court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Domicile, consent, and presence give
general jurisdiction. "Specific jurisdiction" is jurisdiction only over the specific law suit or suits related
to the jurisdiction-giving activity of defendant in the state. It arises when the basis of jurisdiction is
past contacts with the state. It makes sense to think that one and only one state ought to have general
jurisdiction over a defendant, and, therefore, domicile ought to be used. But the Supreme Court's
recent decision seemingly allowing general jurisdiction for mere transitory presence makes even this
use of the single domicile concept nonsense. Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 110 S. Ct.
2105 (1990).
82. See CuRuau,

SELEcmD ESSAYS ON T~m CONFcLT OF LAws (1963).

83. See Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws, Foundationsand Future Directions (1990).
84. In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 303 (1981), Justice Brennan noted: "Minnesota
has three contacts with the parties .... First, and for our purposes a very important contact, Mr.
Hague was a member of Minnesota's work force .... While employment status may implicate a
state interest less substantial than does residence status, that interest is nonetheless important." Id.
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2. Their Acquired Indeterminacy
In the course of actually applying the lex loci rules to cases,
certain judgments must inevitably be made. These are mostly judgments about when to apply which rule, or whether to apply any
rule, other than lex fori. In other words, in the course of actual
application, the rules have acquired rules about the application of
the rules. These acquired rules of application add substantially to
the uncertainty of outcome of the traditional doctrine. These acquired rules are called "wrinkles" by some commentators85 and
"escape devices" by others. 86 "Wrinkles" implies little flaws or rough
spots in an otherwise symmetrical and smooth conceptual scheme,
but "escape devices" is obviously critical of the lex loci doctrine.
Judges used certain "devices" to "escape" from the straight jacket
of lex loci; the desire to escape being a function of the felt injustice
or arbitrariness of the dictated result. My emphasis here has been
on the lack of the vaunted certainty of lex loci, but the usual criticism has been that it is arbitrary in result. In any event, these
"wrinkles" or "escape devices" were an almost inevitable part of
the doctrine and further undermined its certainty.
Public policy was the original device that courts used self-consciously to escape from lex loci. If the foreign-created claim was
at 313. In Foster v. Leggett, 484, S.W.2d 827, 829, the Court noted as practical justification for
choosing Kentucky law: "While appellee was a resident of Ohio, he kept a rented room near his
work in Kentucky, stayed in it on the average of two nights per week and all his employment and
most of his social relationships were in Kentucky." In the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
adopted by every state, the concept of "home state" has been substituted for domicile or residency.
Home state has precise time limits (at least six months) and is not the only way a court can obtain
jurisdiction to make a child custody determination. "Significant connection" and "substantial evidence" may also give jurisdiction. In other words, real affiliation with a state is the basis of judicial
action not a moments residence with a moments "homey" intent, as with domicile. CHL CUSTODY
JURISDICTION ACT §§ 2(5) and 3(a), 9 U.L.A. 133, 143 (1968); W. VA. CODE §§ 48-10-2&3 (1986).
85. BRIMAYER & MARIN, CONFLICT OF LAws, CASES AND MATmLS, 120 (1990).
86. REESE, ROSENERG & HAY, CONFLiCT OF LAWS, CASES & MATRIALS, (9th Ed. 1990); Ch.
8, Sec 2 "Escape Devices"; Crampton, Currie and Kay, Conflict of Laws, Cases-Comments-Questions
(4th Ed.) (1987) Ch. 1, See 2, entitled: "Traditional Practice: A Survey of Escape Devices" at 58;
Lowenfeld, Conflict of Laws, (1986) § 2.01 "Escape Devices." But Leflar, McDougal III, and Felix,
American Conflicts Law (1982) refers (at 314) to "the result- selective 'gimmicks' of substance versus
procedure, characterization, local public policy and renvoi.. ." and not to "escape devices." SIPsoN,
IssUEs AND PERSPECTIWES IN CONFLICT OF LAWS, CASES AND MATERIALS (1985), merely labels the escape
device/wrinkle/gimmicks as "Secondary Traditional Rules" at 51. In voN MEREN & TRAUTMAN,
TaH LAw OF MULTISrAT PROBLEMS (1965), the authors refer to the use of characterization, public
policy, etc. as "covert forms" of doing functional analysis.
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really repugnant to the forum's sense of justice, then the forum
would not lend its court's aid to the actualization of that claim.
Indeed, most statements of the lex loci rules had a public-policy
exception built into the formulation. But, the other "devices," while
inevitable, were not self-consciously used to escape injustice, at least
when first used.
Characterization of the kind of claim one had was necessary
because there was a different rule for tort cases, contract cases,
property cases, etc. Since the categories were very broad and seemingly obvious, in most cases the characterization was done intuitively, without controversy and often without comment, but not
always. Property interests are created by contract; people commit
torts while involved in contractual relationships; people transfer
property by contract and so forth. Therefore, some deliberate substantive classification was inevitable.
Another kind of classification was also inevitable. In enforcing
(actualizing) a foreign-created claim, a forum will want to, even need
to, follow its own enforcement process with all its attendant rules
for initiating and proving claims. Thus, it became necessary to determine whether a particular rule governed the substantive claim or
the remedial process.
Inevitably, also, there were issues about what foreign law to use
in establishing the claim; the whole law of the source-of-claim state
including its choice-of-law rules, or merely its domestic substantive
rules. Moreover, why should the claim be governed by the law of
only one state when it seems to have two or more distinct facets
each with different territorial tags? These two wrinkles are called
"renvoi" and "depecage" respectively.
In the next sections, I will briefly discuss each of these "wrinkles."
It will be well to keep in mind that each is a natural, indeed inevitable, outgrowth of the lex loci doctrine.8 7 However, each has
been exploited by judges to avoid the results seemingly dictated by
lex loci.
87. The problems of substantive classification, public policy, renvoi, procedural-substantive classification and depecage do not go away'with the advent of the modern approaches, but they are no
longer (or should be no longer) devices with which to manipulate results but are now viewed in a
functional way as part of the complex of factors in the calculus of choice.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/8
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a. The Public-Policy Exception
The usual formulation of a lex loci rule contained the publicpolicy exception. Benjamin Cardozo's succinct formulation, "A tort
committed in one state creates a right of action that may be sued
upon in another unless public policy forbids. That is the generally
accepted rule in the United States. "88 He went on to give the classic
definition of "public policy" in this context;
"The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the pleasure of
the judges, to suit the individual notion of expediency or fairness. They do not
close their doors unless help would violate some fundamental principle of justice,

some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the
common weal."''

Notice two things about his formulations: first, the "public policy" that is spoken of is fundamental, prevalent, and deep-rooted,
the foreign state's law triggers the gag reflex of the forum polity;
second, the public policy disables a lawsuit; it disallows plaintiff
from using the forum's court for actualizing its rights. It does not
allow a plaintiff to create a right that did not exist or come into
being in the locus state. These two facets of the public-policy exception are integral to the lex loci concept; the public-policy exception is door closing (not opening) and then, only when the foreign
right outrages the forum.
The original exception, conceived as closing the door on outrageous foreign rights, was quite consistent with the vested rights/
territorial basis of the lex loci doctrine. A right could only come
into being at the time and place of the last event necessary thereto.
If it did not come into being there, it could not conceivably come
into being. Ohio could not create rights for an event taking place
in Kentucky. So says territoriality. But, if Kentucky law created such
a right, then Ohio had a duty to enforce it. So says vested-rights
dogma.90 But, a most natural extension of the territorial sovereignty
theory was that while a forum has a duty to enforce the foreign
right, it has inherent power to refuse to participate in what it views
as clearly immoral rights. "You, the suitor, may have the right, but
88. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198, 200 (1918).
89. Id. at 202.
90. Id.
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the right causes instant nausea in this polity and we refuse to help
you." Thus Cardozo's formulation quoted above. 91 I reiterate in
order to underline the fact that "public policy" is a natural, logically
consistent, and very narrow exception to lex loci. Few doors would
be closed by this exception; indeed, it would be a last desperate
argument when all else failed.92 Moreover, the appeal of lex loci,
its real beauty, is its logical consistency.
However, the public-policy exception has not worked that way.
It has become an all-purpose exception for courts still bent on saying
they are using lex loci when they do not like the results lex loci
dictates. In doing so, the public-policy exception is "a crude tool
to rough justice but not necessarily justice under law." 93
A 1986 West Virginia case is a good example of the modern use
of the public-policy exception. In Paul v. National Bank,94 a case
indistinguishable from Babcock v. Jackson95 (West Virginia driver
and guest on brief trip killed in Indiana due to the driver's mere
negligence; Indiana has a guest statute; West Virginia does not), the
91. See supra, notes 88 & 89 and accompanying text.
92.
We must admit that extreme cases might be imagined in which the mere enforcement of
a foreign right would be an offense against good morals. But such cases cannot ariseamong
the several states of the United States. (emphasis added.)
Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights, 27 YALE L.J. 656, 662 (1918). Professor
Goodrich said in 1927 it would take a "strong case" to deny recognition of a foreign-acquired right
(GOODRICH, CoNFucr oF LAws 12 (1927) but by 1949 he had upped that to an "extraordinary case"
(GooDiucH, CoNsucr oF LAws, (3rd ed. 1949)) perhaps because courts were using public policy too
freely to block claims created by sister states. See Goodrich, Foreign Facts and Local Fancies, 25
VA. L. Rnv. 26 (1938).
93. RicmAN & REYNoLs, UnderstandingConflicts of Law, 123 (1984).
94. 352 S.E.2d 550 (f. Va. 1986).
95. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963). This case is generally considered
the benchmark case of the new era. The author of the opinion, Judge Fuld, had declared that New
York no longer relied upon "the generally accepted rules" (i.e. the Fmsr RESTATEMNT of 1934) in
Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954), at least in contract cases, but the new "grouping
of contracts" theory was not necessary to the result in Auten or in the later opinion by Judge Fuld
in Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65, 175 N.E.2d 441 (1961). See Ehrenzweig, The
"Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of Torts, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 700,

703-05 (1963). Judge Fuld in both Auten and Babcock laments the loss of "certainty, ease of application and predictability" which the traditional rules provided, but that loss was necessary because
of the "unjust and anomalous results" occasioned by the old rules. Id. 12 N.Y.2d at 478-79; 240
N.Y.S.2d at 746-47; 191 N.E.2d at 281, 282. My thesis is that such "certainty," etc. in fact never
obtained.
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West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals refused to follow Babcock's famous lead in rejecting lex loci delicti, but reached the same
result by using the public-policy exception while retaining lex loci
delicti. Alas, conceptually, the lex loci delicti with public-policy exception does not fit the Paul case. As stated above, public policy

closes the door on giving a remedy for some foreign created rights
of action. But in Paul, because mere negligence was alleged, no

foreign (Indiana) cause of action came into being. There was nothing
for West Virginia public policy to close the door on. The West
Virginia court has used the public-policy exception to create a cause

of action that did not exist at the place of the delectus.96
Have other courts done the same thing? Of course. 97 What does
it mean? It means that lex loci delicti has slipped its conceptual
moorings and is merely a simplistic way of talking about making
choice-of-law decisions using one arbitrary factor as the sole designator of choice.
I say "talking about" because the public-policy exception allows

the forum to do whatever it thinks best if the designated foreign
law seems unjust. Remember, in a common-law system, whenever

96. Could one argue that the guest statute is a mere defense to a cause of action as contributory
negligence was viewed as a "mere defense"? Such conceptualization would go as follows: host's
negligence injures guest, a common-law cause of action pops into being in the guest against the host.
But the legislature has intervened, giving the host a privilege (in Holfeldian language) to negligently
inflict harm on guest passengers. Therefore, West Virginia recognizes the Indiana cause of action but
closes its doors on the Indiana defense as against public policy.
There are several reasons why this argument fails to show that the Paul court's use of public
policy is consistent with that doctrine as originally conceived. First, the Indiana legislature did not
"intend" to create such a "privilege" but rather to destroy the common-law-negligence cause of action
where the plaintiff was a guest of the defendant. In fact, the "defense" would be raised by motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Second, the original conception of vested rights was that the
vested right included whatever defenses and limitations pertained thereto according to the creating
sovereign. See supra, note 8. Moreover, courts applying the public-policy exception thought it more
unjust to a defendant not to allow a foreign defense to a foreign cause of action, than to disallow
a plaintiff's foreign cause of action. Closing the door to a cause of action was not a judgment on
the merits and thus not res judicata. But not allowing a defense would mean the cause of action
could go to judgment, which judgment would be resjudicata.See Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper,
286 U.S. 145, 160 (1932); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 547 (1914).
The court in Paul merely used "public policy" as a rhetorical technique for choosing forum
law. Such rhetorical technique avoids the articulation of choice generally considered essential to the
validity of judicial practice. See supra, note 92; infra, note 99 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Owen v. Owen, 444 N.W.2d 710 (S.D. 1989).
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a local judicial precedent seems unjust, it can be, and usually is,
eventually overruled. Therefore, whatever common-law rule a polity
follows will necessarily be the just rule by its lights. 9 So whenever

the lex loci delicti designates a foreign law that is substantively different from the forum law (i.e., will make a difference in the outcome of the case), it will be trumped by the public-policy exception
in favor of forum law. 99 Lex loci delicti becomes lex fori.
What has just been said presupposes that the public-policy exception as it actually developed in the cases is stronger medicine
than that prescribed by Judge Cardozo as quoted above. The Paul
case does not necessarily need such a stronger version of public
policy because guest statutes have become so putrid to our compensation oriented sense of justice that the Cardozo version might
reach guest statutes. And the court in Paul emphasized the abuse
guest statutes have had heaped on them in recent years. 1'0 But, in
other courts, the public-policy exception has been of a much stronger
variety (i.e., a weaker public policy will suffice to trump the foreign
law) such that its use, when coupled with forgetting the door-closing
aspects, pushes lex loci towards lexfori in any case of real conflict.
This broadening of the exception makes lex loci even more uncertain than it was as originally conceived. But, there is another
aspect to the public-policy exception, as actually used by the courts,
that further increases the conceptual arbitrariness of the results
reached under lex loci. The Paul case is an excellent example of this
other aspect. In Paul, both plaintiff and defendant were West Vir-

98. Of course, such a statement is subject to qualifications. There must be an occasion for
overruling the unjust precedent, which means that if the precedent is treated as "law" it may be
"bad law" for some time. Moreover, the unjustness of the precedential rule must outweigh the value
of a settled rule in promoting predictability, as in "it's better for some rules to be well-settled than
settled well." Nonetheless, "the common law works itself pure" (in Lord Mansfield's famous phrase),
and overruling unjust common-law precedent is how it works itself pure - "pure" by the best lights
of the current state high court judges.

99. See, e.g., Gibson v. Fullin, 172 Conn. 407, 374 A.2d 1061 (1977); Marchik v. Coronet
Insurance Co., 40 I11. 2d 327, 239 N.E.2d 799 (1968); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d
34, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961); Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936);
Chase v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 156 W. Va. 444, 195 S.E.2d 810 (1973); Poling v. Poling, 116 W.
Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935).
100. Paul, at 553.
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ginia domiciliaries; the relationship between the parties was formed
in West Virginia; the motor trip was to start and end here; the

insurance was bought here. In other words, any modern choice-oflaw system would pick West Virginia law to determine the standard
of liability growing out of the use of the car as between these two
people. J0 t And the court pointed out in Paul that "[t]his State must
have some connection with the controversy above and beyond mere
service of process [within the state] before the rule we announce
today will apply."' 0 2 In other words, it is against West Virginia public policy to use a guest statute when West Virginia has an interest
in the outcome of the case; but, if we just happen to be the forum
to arbitrate an essentially foreign dispute, we do not care how arbitrary the foreign law is. This attitude would doubtless violate the
privileges and immunities clause of the constitution,0 3 but that's
beside the point. What the little recital of the necessity of a connection with the forum shows is that a state's interest in having its
own law apply is fueling the public-policy exception. And that is
exactly what Professors Paulsen and Sovern found to be the case
as far back as 1956. t 04
101. In other words, as posited in the second section of this article, it makes sense to settle this
dispute between West Virginians occurring in a West Virginia court according to West Virginia law.
102. Paul at 556, n.14.
103. "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens
of the several States." U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2. If modem analysis is used and the conclusion reached
that it is reasonable, given the foreign setting of the dispute, to apply foreign law, no privilege and
immunity problem arises. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948). Indeed, as Toomer suggests
and a number of cases have held, not to apply foreign law when the setting is entirely foreign may
violate either the Due Process Clause or the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. See Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (Due Process Clause); Order of
Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947) (Full Faith and Credit); see also, Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). But where a forum will ignore a foreign limitation on
a cause of action or create a local cause of action in the name of public policy (and not because of
the multistate nature of the case), but not apply that same public policy if the claimant is a nonresident, then a privilege and immunity granted state citizens is being denied to a citizen of another
state merely because of the "other-state" citizenship. See Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper,
470 U.S. 274, 281 n.10 (1985) (quoting Justice Bushrod Washington's list of "fundamental rights"
protected by the P&I clause as including "to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts
of the state" and noting "that those privileges on Justice Washington's list would still be protected
by the clause.") But see, Ortreger v. State Board of Control, 99 Cal. App. 3d 1, 160 Cal. Rptr. 317
(1979), appealdismissed, 449 U.S. 870 (1980). One suspects that should a nonresident be denied the
public policy exception to a foreign guest statute claim d la Paul, the United States Supreme Court
would ignore Paul's reasoning and simply assume it was a choice of law issue resolved by the greater
contacts with the guest statute state.
104. Paulsen
& Sovern,
Public
Policy in @
theWVU,
Conflict
of Laws, 56 CoLuM. L. Rav. 969 (1956).
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They pointed out that
"[tihe overwhelming number of cases which have rejected foreign law on publicpolicy grounds are cases with which the forum had some important connection
....
The common invocation of the public policy argument to defeat a foreign
claim is a denial that foreign law should govern at all and an assertion of the
forum's right to have its law applied to the transaction because of the forum's
relationship to it.""'

And thirty-three years ago Paulsen and Sovern attacked this "crude
tool" as having the principal vice of "providing a substitute for
analysis." The concept "stands in the way of careful thought, of
discriminating distinctions, and of true policy development in the
conflict of law."1 I06
b.

The Characterization Maneuver

There are two kinds of characterizing that a court must inevitably
do given the lex loci dogma: it must determine, "characterize," the
kind of substantive claim the plaintiff is asserting, i.e., tort, contract, or some other, and it must determine whether a particular
rule governs the substantive claim or merely pertains to the process
by which the claim is enforced or actualized.
i.

Subject matter characterization

In order to use the lex loci rules, the court must first characterize
the cause of action or right as to its substantive field, i.e., torts,
contracts, or some other. Since the lex loci rules are very simple
(and thus very broad), there are only a few large areas that are
material to this task. Tort cases, i.e., all "civil wrongs," are one
class; contracts, i.e., every kind of enforceable promise, is another
single class. In many (even most) cases this task is simple and uncontroversial: a self-evident intuition. Indeed, Professor Beale thought
it so self-evident that he did not discuss (or even mention) the problem in his lengthy and exhaustive treatise on the Conflict of Laws:
the definitive statement of the vested rights/territorial thesis. 107 The

105. Id. at 981.
106. Id. at 1016.
107. J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT O1 LAWS (1935); see also R. CRAMIrON, D. CuRRn
& H. KAY, CoNFLIcT OF LAWS: CAsEs-CoMMENTS-QUEsTIONs 90-94, (4th ed. 1987).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/8
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First Restatement made no mention of the problem at all. l 0s Beale
and the First Restatement apparently followed the "just know" rule

(e.g., "you just
know that's a tort case," "that there's a property
9

case,"

etc.). 10

However, it should be equally obvious upon a moments reflection
that many cases are not-so obvious. Is the foreclosure of a mortgage
a property case or a contract case? 110 Does an employment injury
case sound in tort or contract?' Any case involving vicarious iability for tortious conduct is a problem in classification; does liability grow out the contractual relationship between the defendant
12
and tortfeasor, or does liability grow out of the tortious conduct?
Trusts, the devolution of property, real and personal, are also fraught
with characterization problems. 13 But even in the simplest case a
characterization issue can be dredged up if one digs deep enough.
In fact, "characterization" has been aptly characterized as a device by which courts manipulate their way out of unpleasant results
seemingly dictated by the "obvious" application of the lex loci norm.
For example, in the oft-cited Levy v. Daniels' U- Drive Auto Renting
Co.,114 a tort claim against the tortious renter driver and the owner

108. See L. BRn AYER & J. MARinm,

CONFLICT OF LAws, CASES AND MATERLUS (3d ed. 1990).

109.
(2) The method of characterization most widely employed by the courts is a form of lowlevel labeling. The decider stands off from the problem for a moment, contemplates his
navel, and concludes this specimen looks like a tadpole, or a minnow, or a chameleon.
The conclusion reached is thought to be so obvious (can't you see that's a minnow?) that
supporting reasoning is not necessary.
R. CRAMProN, D. CuRiE & H. KAY, supra note 105, at 90; see, e.g., Swank v. Hufnagle, l1l Ind.
453, 12 N.E. 303 (1887).
110. LiljedahlI v. Glassgow, 190 Iowa 827, 180 N.W. 870 (1921) (contract); Wilson v. Kryger,
29 N.D. 28, 149 N.W. 721 (1914), aff'd, 242 U.S. 171 (1916) (property); See Goodrich, Two States
and Real Fstate, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 417 (1941); Note, Choice of Law Governing Land Transactions:
The Contract-ConveyanceDichotomy, I11 U. PA. L. Rxv. 482 (1963).
111. Alabama Great Southern R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803, 807-808 (1892)
(tort); Wilson v. Faull, 45 N.J. Super. 555, 133 A.2d 695, 698 (1957), rev'd on other grounds, 27
N.J. 105, 141 A.2d 768 (1958) (contract).
112. R. CRlmpoM, D. CuRIE & H. KAY, supra note 107, at 75-78.
113. Caldwell v. Gore, 175 La. 501, 143 So. 387 (1932) (dam break flooding neighbor, property
or tort case?); Cutts v. Najdrowski, 123 N.J. Eq. 481, 198 A. 885 (1938) (savings book trust - inter
vivos or testamentary); see R. CRAMroN, D. CuaRRI & H. KAY, supra note 107, at 87-90 ("Savings
Bank Trust - Gift, Trust, Will or What not?").
114. 108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163 (1928).
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of a car was converted into a third party beneficiary contract suit
in order to take advantage of a place of rental law that said rented
cars created -vicarious liability in the renter. The state of the accident,
and thus of the "delectus," had no such law. In a 1974 case, the
Fourth Circuit managed to distinguish Levy with some clever conceptualistic reasoning, demonstrating again the intricacy and hollowness of lex loci analysis, as well as the uncertainty of its results. "5
Sometimes, part of a case, a separable issue, say, can be given a
certain characteristic that changes the locus of that issue and thus
of the choice of law in a crucial conflict of laws. For example, in
Haumschildv. ContinentalGas Co. ,116 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
characterized the issue of interspousal immunity from tort liability
as a question of family law, not as a question of tort law, and
therefore, applied the law of the parties domicile (Wisconsin) rather
than that of the place, of the accident (California). Thus, the court
was able to reach a result it wanted (Wisconsin, the forum, had no
interspousal immunity, the "modern" view) and which made more
17
sense from a conflict-of-laws standpoint.

115. Kline v. Wheels by Kinney, Inc., 464 F.2d 184, 186 (4th Cir. 1972). Judge Field reasoned
that the Connecticut law in Levy was focused on car rental and thus that law was part of any car
rental agreement, but that the New York law was directed at all owners being liable for torts of
permissive users and therefore did not become part of rental agreements but was merely an addition
to New York tort law which had no application to a North Carolina accident under that state's lex
loci delicti rule. Judge Butzner dissented, finding it reasonable to believe that North Carolina would
have seen the case as ex contractu, and the New York law as part of the contract and allowed recovery.
Judge Butzner's dissent in essence says that given the total facts and legal circumstances of this case
it makes sense to allow recovery against the renter.
116. 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814, 817-18 (1959).
117. In Haumschild, the court technically used characterization but the reasons given for the
characterization were functional not conceptual:
We think that disabilities to sue and immunities from suit because of a family relationship
are more properly determined by reference to the law of the state of the family domicile.
That state has the primary responsibility for establishing and regulating the incidents of
the family relationship and it is the only state in which the parties can, by participation
in the legislative process, effect a change in those incidents. Moreover, it is undesirable that
the rights, duties ... conferred or imposed by the family relationship should constantly
change ... during temporary absences from ... [the home state].
Id. at 817 (quoting Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218, 222-23 (1955) (Traynor, J.)).
Clearly this policy reason for denying capacity to sue [preventing family discord] more properly lies
within the sphere of family law, where domicile usually controls the law to be applied, than it does
tort law where .. ." Id. at 817-18.
This is an early example (and much commented on) of a case where the court simply applied

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/8
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Curiously, this characterization device is sometimes conspicuously overlooked by courts straining to reach sensible results while
adhering to lex loci. In Chase v. Greyhound Bus Lines,118 for example, the court made no mention of the possibility of (and precedent for) characterizing the family immunity issue crucial to resolving
that case as a question of family law. The court assumed that a
Pennsylvania accident case was controlled by Pennsylvania law as
to every substantive issue even though the family lived in West Virginia and the trip began and was to end in West Virginia.
In any event, characterization is inevitable if using lex loci doctrine,119 and it adds substantial uncertainty to lex loci choice of law
even when used by judges who care nothing for the equities of the
outcomes of their cases. Moreover, when used by judges who like
equitable results, it is a ready means to the correct result. When it
is used with depecage and other "escape devices," it makes for some
clever conceptualistic reasoning in the service of results that make
sense. Judge Roger Traynor of the California court was the master
of such technique. He later obliquely apologized for having to use
such technique:
"I do not regard it [Grant v. McAuliffe]'O as ideally articulated, developed as
it had to be against the brooding background of a petrified forest. Yet, I would
make no more apology for it than that in reaching a rational result it was less
deft than it might have been to quit itself of the familiar speech of choice of
law . ,21

the law that made the most sense to apply. The court also used a technique called "depecage" a
french word for splitting the various legal issues in a case apart and making separate choice of law
decisions as to each issue: the law of state A might control one issue, (say) whether defendant's
conduct was negligent, and the law of state B another, (say) whether defendant's negligence results
in liability where defendant's victim is his wife. Depecage is a technique ignored by the FmsT REsTATEmENT, and assumed as routine practice by the Second. See Reese, Depecage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 CoLum. L. Rnv. 58 (1973). Professor Willis L.M. Reese of Columbia
University Law School was the reporter for the SEcoND RTATEmENT, CoNMcT oF LAws.

118. 156 W. Va. 397, 184 S.E.2d 810 (1973).
119. Even in cases like Chase, 184 S.E.2d 810, see supra note 116 and accompanying text,
characterization is done intuitively and unconsciously, but done it is; one cannot get to lex loci delicti
without characterizing the case as a "delectus" or tort.
120. 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
121. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary? 37 TEX. L. Ray. 657, 670 n.35 (1959); see also
Bernkrant v. by
Fowler,
55 Cal. 2dRepository
588, 12 Cal.@Rptr.
360 P.2d 906 (1961).
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Substantive-Procedure Characterization

Another distinction that must be made in every conflict case
using the vested rights/territorial theory of lex loci is whether a
particular rule claimed to apply to the case is part of the vested
right itself (in which case the locus rule is used) or whether it is
merely a rule governing the perfection of the right (in which case
the forum rule is used). This distinction is usually expressed as substantive/procedural characterization. The reason for the distinction
is conceptual, not functional, as is true of most of the [ex loci distinctions. This conceptualistic reasoning goes as follows: if the rule
is merely one about perfecting the right (rules about proof of facts,
pleadings, and remedies), then the vested right itself is not changed
by the rule although the kind of judgment the cause of action engenders may be changed. These procedural rules for perfecting rights,
territoriality informs us, ought to come from the forum. So lex loci
for substantive rules, lex fori for procedural rules.
Unfortunately, the distinction is more easily stated than made
even if one sticks to the conceptual basis for the distinction. Rules
about time limitations on actions, burdens of proof, statutes of fraud,
survival of actions, and limitations on recovery are not unambiguously either substantive or procedural.
For example, a statute of limitations was (is?) thought to merely
cut off the remedy, but not the right itself.'2 By this conceptual
mode of thought then, a statute of limitation was procedural and
the forum applied its own limitation even if longer than that of the
substantive law state. It thus might recognize a right now unen2
forceable (but not "dead") in the "vesting" state.'1
But wait, sometimes a time limitation on bringing a cause of
action was contained in the very law creating the cause of action.
Then it "felt" as if the limitation was part of the law creating the
right, and, thus, the passing of the time limit cut off the right it-

122. J. BEALE, supra note 107, at §§ 604, 605 (1935).
123. See cases cited and a critique of this rationale in Lorenzen, Statutes of Limitations and
the Conflict of Laws, 28 YALE L.J. 492 (1919), reprinted in Lorenzen, SmcTED AR7cLEs ON TmE
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/8
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self.1 24 Therefore, the issue became whether the statute of limitation
was a "general" statute applying to all of an area of, for instance,
common-law claims for tortious bodily injury, or was a specific
statute aimed at specific rights such that it would be reasonable to
infer that it was intended to qualify or kill the right itself. as Usually,
but not always, the specific statute was part of the same enactment
creating the right. 126 Usually, but not always, when a limitation was
contained in the same enactment it was held to cut off the right. 127
Legislatures have long since entered the statute of limitation
choice-of-law arena with borrowing statutes. We now have an old
uniform borrowing statute and a new uniform borrowing statute,
meaning that neither is uniform. 12 When stacked on top of tolling
statutes, they make for some interesting cases.1 29
Burdens of proof create another kind of conceptual dilemma.
When state A said the burden was on plaintiff to disprove contributory negligence, "absence of contributory negligence" became
part of the plaintiff's cause of action and must have been pleaded.
It appeared thus to be substantive. When state B said the burden
is on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent, then, plaintiff need not plead the absence of contributory
124. J. BEALE, supra note 107.
125. Bournais v. Atlantic Maritime Co. Ltd., 220 F.2d 152, 154-56 (2nd Cir. 1955).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Uniform Statute of Limitations on Foreign Claims Act (1957) (withdrawn 1978) (as between
the foreign and the forum time limit, the shorter controls). Only three states adopted the Uniform
Act. West Virginia was one of them. W. VA. CODE §§ 55-2A-1 to -5. In 1982 a new UNssoiu CONFLICT
OP LAws-LUMATIONS ACT, 12 U.L.A. 59 (1982) was promulgated, making statutes of limitations
substantive. It too has been adopted by few states. See 12 U~i~oass LAws ANNOTATED 59 (Supp.
1991) for a current list of the states adopting it. Many states have adopted a law "borrowing" the
limitation of the state where the "cause of action" or "claim" "arose" or "accrued." But according
to L. BRuuMYER & J. MARTIN, supra note 108, at 149: "Such statutes are remarkably varied and
cover or fail to cover a wide variety of questions." For an interesting (actually wrLD! case) see Duke
v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334 (,yo.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863 (1979). For a case where the substantive
law choice was different from the place where the cause of action arose, see George v. Douglas
Aircraft, 332 F.2d 73 (1964).
129. See West v. Theis, 15 Idaho 167, 96 P. 932 (1908) (the grand-daddy of such cases). See
generally, Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limitations and the Conflicts of Laws, 15 U. FLA. L. REv.
33 (1962); Grossman, Statutes of Limitationsand the Conflicts of Laws: Modern Analysis, 1980 Asuz.
ST. L.J. 1; Vernon, The Uniform Statute of Limitations on Foreign Claims Act: Tolling Problems,
12 VAin. L.by
Rav.
982 (1959).
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negligence and it is not part of the plaintiff's cause of action. If a
vested right is viewed as a vested cause of action (or chose in action),
and a cause of action is the material facts one must plead (to state
a cause of action), and contributory negligence is a material fact,
then the absence of contributory negligence is part of the statement
of one's cause of action in states that require plaintiff to prove its
absence, and not part of the statement of the cause of action when
defendant must prove its existence. And, since the statement in a
formal pleading of the cause of action appears to be synonomous
with having a cause of action, then the rule about the burden of
proof of contributory negligence appears to be a rule about the
vested right (cause of action) itself, and, thus, dictated by lex leci
deliciti. 30
But wait, if a vested right is a construct of the law creating it
and that law (be it statutory or common law) names all the factual
elements that must be established in order to have a right (and a
cause of action), then it matters not who has the burden of actually
establishing the facts at trial (a mere matter of proof); that burden
does not alter the substantive law creating the right of action. Thus,
a rule about who has the burden of proof is a mere matter of
procedure and the forum should use its own rule. Most of the time
this second conceptualization of the burden of proof problem prevailed and burdens of proof were considered a procedural rule of
the forum. 31
Statutes of fraud may be procedural or substantive depending
on interpretation of the statute as to whether it is worded so as to
bar the contract or merely bar suit on the contract. The conceptual
game is played out in deep earnest with ludicrous results if the statute
of frauds of the place of contracting only bars the remedy and that
of the forum bars the contract but not the remedy. In that case,

130. See Lemieux v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 219 Mass. 399, 106 N.E. 992 (1914).

131. See Levy v. Steiger, 233 Mass. 600, 124 N.E. 477 (1919); see also Sampson v. Channell,
110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940) (holding the burden of proof was "sub-

stantive" for purposes of applying state law but "procedural" under the state law then applied).
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an oral contract will be enforced though it does not satisfy the statute of frauds of either the place of making or the forum of enforcement.1 12 Survival and revival of actions had a similar history
as did limitations on the amount recoverable. They can be conceptualized either way.'
The distinction between substantive and procedural law is still
used even in "modern" choice-of-law schemes, but the distinction
is now likely to be marked out by a functional test. 3 4 The question
will be, is any particular rule, whether abstractly substantive or procedural, one that it "makes sense" to import from another state or
not. The fact that the other state's law is in some way "adjective"
or "procedural" will figure in the "makes sense" calculus pushing
generally against using out-of-state law. The more it tends to be
purely procedural, the more likely will it be thought inappropriate
to use foreign state law. Indeed, in the last thirty years of lex loci
dominance, a more functional definition of "procedural" was increasingly used, as reflected in the 1934 Restatement itself.1 35
c. Renvoi
Yet another source of uncertainty inherent in any system of conflict of laws, but to which lex loci conceptualism is especially prone,
is determining what exactly one means by "the law of another state."
The vested cause of action would seem to point to whatever law
determines the contours of a like cause of action in that other state's
132. See Marie v. Garrison, 13 Abb. N. Cas. 210 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1883). RESTATEmENT (SEcoND)
OF CONFtICT OF LAWS, § 598 comment a (1934) concludes: "If the statute of frauds of tlie place of

contracting is procedural only and that of the forum goes to substance only, an oral contract will
be enforced though it does not conform to either statute."
133. Nelson v. Eckert, 231 Ark. 348, 329 S.W.2d 426 (1959); Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d
859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
134. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFUCT OF LAws § 122 comments a, b (1969); see also 1988
Revisions to REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CoNFucT OF LAWS § 142 comment e (Proposed Revision
1988):

[Subsequent cases] no longer characterize the issue of limitations as ipso facto procedural
and hence governed by the law of the forum. Instead, the courts select the state whose law

will be applied to the issue of limitations by a process essentially similar to that used in
the case of other issues of choice of law. These cases represent the emerging trend.
See also Ledesma v. Jack Stewart Produce, Inc., 816 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1987); Good v. Elotex Corp.,
831 F.2d 508 (4th Cir. 1987) cert. denied, 487 U.S.1218 (1988).
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 12 introductory note (1934), quoted in
R. CRAMPTON, D. CuRuu & H. KAY, supra note 107, at 95-96.
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courts. But, if the other state takes into account the interstate nature
of the facts creating the cause of action in determining its contours
(or its existence), then ought not the forum state do likewise in
determining the foreign cause of action? In other words, is not the
law of state A, the law that the courts of state A would apply in
this very case if it were before them, and should not a court of
state B apply as the law of state A the very law state A's courts
would apply to this case now before state B?
Stated this way the answer seemed obvious. Of course, the law
of state A is the law its courts would apply in this case. For example,
a West Virginia domiciled family goes to Pennsylvania on a brief
auto trip and has an accident in Pennsylvania while the wife/mother
is driving. Pennsylvania has no family immunity doctrine for auto
torts, but Pennsylvania also follows the law of the state of the domicile of the family in determining which state's law applies. A Pennsylvania court, therefore, would apply West Virginia's doctrine of
intrafamily immunity and disallow all the intrafamily claims against
the wife/mother. 136 Thus, even though West Virginia, following lex
loci delicti, would apply Pennsylvania law, it finds that Pennsylvania
law for this very case to be West Virginia law. So the lexfori would
apply after all.
Or would it? There's a wrinkle in this wrinkle. What if the putative Pennsylvania court in applying West Virginia law takes the
same tack of looking at what a West Virginia court would do and
finds that West Virginia would apply Pennsylvania law? Infinite
oscillation! What looks at first like a perfectly sensible rule turns
out to be unworkable. This doctrine of looking at the "whole law,"
including the choice-of-law rules of the state, is called renvoi. 7

136. These are the facts of Chase v. Greyhounds Lines Inc., 156 W. Va. 397, 184 S.E.2d 810
(1973); see supra note 116.
137. The term "renvoi" is obviously French; the word meaning "to look back." According to
Lorenzen: "It was not until the adoption of the renvoi doctrine by the French Court of Cassation
in the Forgo Case, decided in 1882, that the problem attracted the serious attention of the jurists."
Lorenzen, The Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign Law, 10 CoLuM. L. Rav. 190 (1910),
reprinted in E. LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONmICT OF LAws 19, 20 (1947).
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Professor Beale and the First Restatement objected to renvoi, or
"the renvoi," except in certain very limited circumstances. 1 8 But the

doctrine had its champions, most notably the late Dean Irwin Griswold of Harvard. 139 Although it does seem anomalous to get a dif-

ferent result in the forum applying foreign law than would be gotten
in the foreign state whose law is being applied, few courts have used
renvoi. The reason for non-use is not primarily the dissonance of

the potential for eternal oscillation, but something more fundamental; the rules for choice of law are conceived (or designed) to

pick the domestic rule of the chosen state - not the "whole law." 40
Under lex loci, it is enforcement of a vested right created by the
domestic law of the locus state that is the basis of choice. Under

modern interest analysis approaches, the interest is analyzed in terms
of state domestic law policies. Moreover, the forum uses the choiceof-law rule it deems best by its lights, so why allow the other state
to negate it by using some "lesser" rule?
Nonetheless, renvoi has been used some by courts both to "escape" results dictated by lex loci and because it sometimes seems

to make sense in terms of determining the other state's law. 141 It

138. According to R. CRAMPTON, D. Cumiu & H. KAY, supra note 107: "American legal writers
have been generally hostile to the renvoi doctrine. Professors Cook and Lorenzen, the great enemies
of the territorialist dogma promulgated by Professor Beale, agreed with Beale and his disciple, Judge
Goodrich, that renvoi had no place in common-law jurisprudence. See I Beale, Conflict of Laws 5558 (1935); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 10 (Ist ed. 1927); Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of
Conflict of Laws ch. IX (1942); Lorenzen, Selected Articles on the Conflict of Laws 19-79 (1947)."
R. Cpa,pToN, D. CuRim, & H. KAY, supra note 107 at 66.
R=STATEMENT op CONTICT OF LAWS § 7 (1934) stated that "since the only Conflict of Laws
used in the determination of [a] case is the Conflict of Laws of the forum ... the foreign law to
be applied is the law applicable to the matter in hand [read: internal or domestic law] and not the
Conflict of Laws of the foreign state." Section 8 contained two long-recognized exceptions: "title to
land" cases, and cases involving "the validity of a decree of divorce." Id. at § 8.
139. Griswald, Renvoi Revisited, 51 HAzv. L. REv. 1165 (1938).
140. "Whole law" is a term frequently used in discussions of renvoi; it refers, of course, to
domestic rules plus choice of law rules, as apposed to "domestic rules" only, which are referred to
as "internal law."
141. It almost always "makes sense" to apply renvoi when renvoi points back to the forum "if the other state would apply the forum state's law why shouldn't the forum?" See, e.g., Norlin
Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 263-64 (2d Cir. 1984); Griggs v. Riley, 489 S.W.2nd 469
(Mo. App. 1972); see also Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962) (where the court in interpreting
the Federal Tort Claims Act's choice of law provision (28 U.S.C. § 1346) held that "the whole law"
of the place where the act or omission occurred should be applied). In none of these cases is the
word "renvoi' used. As a rule, the word "renvoi" is used only where the renvoi doctrine is rejected.
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adds to the indeterminacy of lex loci more than with modern approaches to choice of law because modern approaches remove the
incentive to escape from senseless results. Moreover, modern approaches take into account the indeterminacy of foreign law such
that determining what the pertinent foreign law is, and what it means
for the specific case under analysis, is integral to the choice-of-law
analysis. Lex loci in general assumes a determinacy of foreign law
(or of domestic law) that simply does not obtain.
Lex loci assumes, and must assume for its vested-right premise,
142
that common-law-judicial precedent is law in a positive sense.
Courts using lex loci assume foreign courts will follow precedent
even though they know that courts often modify, ignore, overrule,
and choose among precedent.1 43 Moreover, common-law precedent
must at least be interpreted, and that process is surely less certain
than statutory interpretation. Even in cases seemingly controlled by
statutes, there is an indeterminacy not usually recognized by a foreign court. In any event, renvoi allow courts occasionally to escape
the false determinacy of foreign law by escaping back to the lexfori
and, thus, adding to the indeterminacy of lex loci. 44
3. In Sum
Lex loci doctrine has not determined choice of law in conflicts
situations in a simple, clear, and decisive way and it cannot. Even
the conceptually purest form of lex loci, lex loci delecti, is inherently
indeterminate, although it does far better than any other form except
perhaps for lex loci rei situs for immovables. Moreover, even the
easiest case for lex loci delecti (and the one judges must have in
mind when talking about its certainty, predictability, and ease of
application), the ubiquitous auto negligence tort, lacks certainty because of the propensity of judges to escape results they dislike through
devices that are perfectly consistent with the vested right/territorial
142. The assumption is that courts lay down rules in common law cases and that the rules thus
laid down are binding law. It is indeed the assumption of Erie v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). But
we all know two things: (a) courts can, and regularly do, overrule common law rules (see Morning
Star v. Black & Decker, Inc., 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1979)); and (b) courts usually don't lay down
rules that can be (1) easily identified as the rule laid down, and (2) easily understood outside of the
facts situation in which laid down. See generally K. LL-wEILYN, THE CoMMON LAW TRADMON:
DacmmN( APPEa.s (1960).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/8
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143. Id.
144. See, e.g., University of Chicago v. Dater, 277 Mich. 653, 270 N.W. 175 (1936).
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foundation of lex loci. They declare the locus law to be against
forum public policy, or declare the cause of action to be one of
implied or express contract, or of family law and not tort, or declare
the issue to be procedural not substantive, or use a covert form of
renvoi and declare the law of the locus to be different for multistate
torts than for single state torts. All of these "escapes" are done
more or less in the form of a declaration: a bald and bland statement
declaring the decisive fact. Little or no analysis precedes or follows
the declaration.
Hopefully, it is clear by now that lex loci lacks the one virtue
its adherents claim for it: certainty. Lex loci has been abandoned,
for the most part, even by states that pay lip service to its continued
survival.
What of the modern supplanters? Are they as fuzzy as those
who look back with nostalgia to the lost certainty of the lex loci
era seem to believe? For the most part, the supplanters substitute
analysis for rules, and where "rules" are used they are more akin
to flexible guides than dogmatic, result-dictating rules. Analysis requires thought and some tolerance of controversy. In Part II of this
article, 14 I will look at that thought and controversy to show that
predictable results can be and are being obtained under the modern
approaches which, with one notable exception, all add up to the
same thing which I call THE Modern Approach. This new approach
obtains results that are as predictable as most common law dispute
resolution ever is and, more importantly, obtains results that make
sense. The results "make sense" because that is precisely the aim
of modern choice-of-law. In Part II, I hope to demonstrate that if
the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws is used with a "make
sense" attitude and thorough analysis, then fuzzy modern choiceof-law can be brought into clear focus.
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